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They are not parties in a representative capacity-there was no
cause of action in existence till the death of the testatrix.
The
controversy is between living parties. The testatrix is in no sense
a party to the original cause of action. Her act was only the subject matter of investigation. The rule contended for would exclude parties on both sides in all cases where litigation should
arise growing out of the act of another during life. We cannot
construe the proviso of the statute so as to exclude as witnesses
all those who may be parties on one side or the other in all probate appeals like this ; and iie find no error in the ruling. - Shailer
v. Bumstead and others, 99 Mass. 112.
With this reasoning we are satisfied. The real question in the
case is whether there is a will or not, and upon that question all
the parties have a right to testify.
We think the court also erred in excluding parts of the depositions of Steele and Eliza Garvin, offered by the plaintiffs. They
were both upon questions concerning which the defenddnts gave
testimony, and were properly explanatory of and connected with
that testimony. The statement of Steele was material, and when
he says the invitation of Williams was in a cool, formal and distant manner, I think the description was sufficiently particular.
That portion of Eliza Garvin's deposition which mentioned
the kindness of Mrs. Garvin for Petticrew, the testator, was certainly competent. The whole theory of the defense, running
throughout the trial, was, that she cared nothing for him. The
plaintiffs were entitled to the evidence to show its falsity.
For the ruling of the court in rejecting testimony, the judgment
must be reversed and the cause remanded.
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AGENT.

Traveling Salesman.-A traveling merchant, who is authorized
to sell all the goods of his principals that he can sell within his
business circuit, on a commission of ten per cent., is to be regarded as the general agent of his principals, and clothed
apparently with the power of fixing the price, and the time and
mode of delivery of the goods and the payment of the price, unless
a different usage in such trade is shown: Day Light BurnerCo.,
v. Odlin, 50 or 51 N. H.
And third persons will not be affected by a limitation on this
authority which is not brought to their notice, or in relation to
which they are not put upon inquiry: Id.
Therefore, when such agent has sold goods on credit, which are
1. From the judges, to appear in 50 and 51 N. 11. reports.
2. From Hon. O.L. Barbour; to appearin Vol.62 of his reports.
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forwarded by his principal by express, and marked cash on
delivery, the expressman having no notice of any limitation of
the agent's authority, may, upon an order of the agent, deliver
the goods without payment of the price: Td.
Whether the entry of cash on delivery put the .xpressman
on inquiry, was a proper question for the-jury: Id.
ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

Submission partly in Writing and partly Paro.-Where the
terms of a submission to referees are partly in writing and partly
by.parol, an award properly made in pursuance of all said
terms, will be good: Steere v. Tenney, 50 or 51 N. H.
Powers of Arbitrators.-Arbitrators who are not restricted by
the terms of the submission have power to decide conclusively, all
questions of law as well as of fact: Sanborn v. aurphy, 50
N.H.
If the reference is limited by a provision that the award shall
be made in accordance with legal principles, the referees will be
bound by the limitation: and if in such a case they disregard or
mistake the law, their award will be set aside: I.
If arbitrators, acting under a general and unrestricted submission, either do not undertake to govern their action and decision
by the rules and principles of law, as applied in the courts, or, intending'to decide in accordance with those rules and principles,
but also intending, upon due consideration, to act and decide
definitely upon the matters before them, without submitting their
proceedings and judgment to the court foi- revision, their conclusions will not be disturbed and their award will be sustained: Di.
This general rule admits of but one exception, which is that
where the arbitrators have manifestly fallen into such an error
with regard to facts or law in the case before them as must have
prevented the free and fair exercise of their judgment, the award
will be set aside: I'.
This exception has reference not to an erroneous conclusion oi
judgment upon the applicatioi of the law-which i-ill not avail to
disturb the award-but to a manifest mistake, such as must have
precluded the exercise of judgment : It.
It is a settled rule in the courts of law and equity, that no presumption shall be raised for the sake of overturning an award,
but every reasonable intendment shall be allowedto uphold it: Id.
AssumPsIT.
When not implied by work and labor-Familyrelation.-The
plaintiff, sister of the defendant's wife, lived and worked in his
family thirty years. She had no property, except money and
clothing occasionally delivered to her by the defendant or, his
wife. During these thirty years the defendant supported her,
and no account was kept by any one, of her time, wages, expenses, or support. Held, that, in this condition of things, the
law would not imply a promise by the defendant to pay the
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plaintiff for her services, although the same might have been, upon
the whole, valuable to the defendant; but the defendant could be
charged only upon proof of an understanding between the plaintiff and the defendant that the former should receive payment for
her services: Bundy v. Hyde, 50 N. H.
The instruction of the court to the jury, that if the parties understood that the plaintiff was not to be paid for her labor in
money, but was to be supported during life by the defendant, and
if after the plaintiff ceased to labor for the defendant he ceased to
support her, the plaintiff c6uld not recover in general indebitatus
assumpsit, was held to be correct: Id.
BAILMENT.

Bill in Equity to edeem.-A. bill in equity may be maintained
to redeem a pledge, if an account is wanted, or if there has been
an assignment of the pledge: White .BountainsRail Boad v. Bay
State Iron co., 50 N. H.
The pledgors of bonds secured by mortgages may redeem the
bonds after the lapse of fifteen years, notwithstanding the pledgee
has foreclosed the mortgages: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Judgment of another State.-If a State should go out'of the
Union so as to stand in the relation of a foreign government for a
time, yet upon its return into the Union again, all judgments
rendered, while it was a foreign government, must be authenticated in the same way as other State records: Steere v. Tenney,
50 or 51 N. H.
The records of a foreign government are to be authenticated as
suctl, only during the existing of such foreign power: Id.
CORPORATIONS.

Liabilities of Trustees for Debts.-Claims of a portion of the
trustees of a manufacturing corporation against the corporation,
although they may be within the letter of the act of 1848 authorizing the formation of corporations for manufacturing and other purposes, which makes the trustees, in case of failure to make an
annual report, jointly and severally liable "for all the debts of the
company," &c., yet, not being within the mischief intended to be
remedied or prevented by it, nor within its spirit and intention, they
are not within its provisions: Briggs v. Easterly et al., 62 Barb.
Thus, where, at the time a default in making the annual report
required by the statute occurred, claims against the corporation
were held by two of the trustees, who, with the others, were
delinquent in making their report. Held that an assignee of such
claims could not enforce the same against all the trustees under
section 12 of the statute: Id.
CRIMINAL LAw.

False Pretences--Indictment--Proof.-Tosustain an indictment
for obtaining the signature of an individual to promissory notes
given for the price of property sold to him by false pretenses, the
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pretenses alleged to be false must be shown to be of some existing
fact, and made for the purpose of inducing the purchaser to
execute the notes. Scott v. The People, 62 Barb.
Both the inducement and the fraudulent purpose are facts to be
proved, and are not to be presumed: Id.
An indictment for obtaining the signature of a purchaser to
promissory notes given for the purchase price of property sold to
him by false pretences and representations as to the price asked
for the property by a third person, who was the owner, cannot
be sustained where the proof shows that no representations were
made by the defendant in regard to the price except that he told
the purchaser in the course of the negotiations, that he did not
think the seller would take less than a sum named, and that
the only representations as to price, at the time of the sale, were
made by the seller: Id.
Although the price asked for, and finally agreed to be paid by
the purchaser be fixed by collusion between the owner of the
property and the defendant, for the purpose of defrauding the
purchaser, such collusion, though it may be an indictable offense,
is not the offense charged: Id.
If, in fact, the price agreed to be paid by the purchaser was
the price demanded by the seller at the time of the sale, the
motive in asking that price is of no consequence so far as the
offense charged is concerned: rd.
Declarations.-The declarations of one or several persons
engaged in a concerted attack upon the dwelling and family of
another, made while the attack is going on,, are admissible against
all; but if made after the attack has terminated, and- merely in
narrative of a past occurrence, they are not admissible: State v.
Pike, et al, 50 or 51 N. H.
The finding of the judge who tried the cause that the concerted attack was still in progress, is sufficient to authorize the
admission of such declarations with 'proper instructions, unless it
appear already from the evidence that it was otherwise: Id.
Insanity-Evidenceof-Experts.-Opinions of witnesses, not
experts, cannot be received on the question of sanity: State v.
Jones, 50 N. H.
On trial of defendant for the murder of his wife, the defense was insanity. Evidence was introduced tending to show
that he had believed his wife guilty of adultery with one F., and
that he killed her for that reason; also, that during the trial- defendant had said his belief in his wife's infidelity was founded not
only on public rumor, but also on his own observation; and it
was claimed for him that this belief was an insane delusion.
Held, that evidence tending to show the existence of such a common rumor in the village where defendant and his wife lived, was
properly received: Id.
Held, that as bearing upon the question of sanity, the State
was properly allowed to prove to a large extent the history of
defendant, including his treatment of his wife and children;
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his health, intemperance, impulsive temperament, excitable nature, quarrels, wrangling, making preparations and threats to
shoot a neighbor, and violent conduct at various times during a
period of many years before the death of his wife: Id.
At the trial the court charged the jury that "if the defendant
killed his wife in a manner that would be criminal and unlawful
if the defendant were sane, the verdict should be "not guilty, by
reason of insanity," if the killing was the offspring or product
of mental disease in the defendant.
Neither delusion or knowledge of right and wrong, nor design or cunning in planning and
executing the killing, and escaping or avoiding detection, nor
ability to recognize acquaintances, or to labor, or to transact business, or to manage affairs, is, as matter of law, a test of mental disease; but all symptoms and all tests of mental disease are
purely matters of fact, to be determined by the jury. Whether
the defendant had a mental disease, and whether the killing of
his wife was the product of such disease, are questions of fact for
the jury. Insanity is mental disease-disease of the mind. An
act produced by mental disease is not crime; if the defendant had
a mental disease which irresistibly impelled him to kill his wifeif the killing was the product of mental disease in him-he is not
guilty. Insanity is not innocence, unless it produced the killing
of his wife. If the defendant had an insane impulse to kill his
wife, and-could have successfully resisted it, he was responsible.
Whether every insane impulse to kill is always irresistible, is a
question of fact. Whether in this case the defendant had an insane impulse to kill his wife, and whether he could resist it, are
questions of fact.
Whether an act may be produced by partial
insanity, when no connection can be discovered between the act
and the disease, is a question of fact. The defendant is to be acquitted on the ground of insanity, unless the jury are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not produced by
mental disease." Held, that these instructions were correct.
I.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Chattel Mortgage-Retention of Possession by the Mor/qagor._
When on a mortgage of a stock of goods in a country store, it
was agreed, verbally, that the mortgagor should continue in
possession of the store and goods, and sell the goods as before for
his own benefit, and he did so, it was hel d that such an arrangement was inconsistent, with the avowed o ject of the mortgage,
and rendered it fraudulent and void as to the mortgagor's creditors:
Putnam v. Osgood, 50 or 51 N. H.
Where the mortgagee was indebted to the mortgagor on account,
and it was agreed that the amount sh.ould be applied in part payment of the mortgage debt, and the accounts were thereupon
discharged with the assent of both parties, it was held that this
was equivalent to a payment in money on that debt: f.
Under the law requiring an account of the amount due upon
the debt or demand secured by the mortgage, an account of the
liabilities so secured must be given: Id.
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An account rendered by a mortgagor to an attacking creditor
is not necessarily false within the meaning of the statutes, because
by mistake it is made greater than the amount really due, provided the account is rendered in perfect good faith and with all
reasonable efforts to make it just and correct: Id.
DESERTER.

The U. S. Act of March 3, 1865, does not contemplate the forfeiture of citizenship as a penalty for desertion, until after
conviction of the crime of desertion before a court-martial:
Severance v. Healey, 50 N. H.
DIVORCE.

Jurisdictionof Chancery.-The former Court of Chancery in
this State had no jurisdiction to grant divorces independent of
the statutes on that subject: Crain v. Cavana, 62 Barb.
Allowance for Support, etc.-The provisions of the revised
statutes relating to separation and limited divorces, do not
authorize the court, by the decree in a suit for separation a
mensa et thoro, to allow a gross sum to the wife for her support
and direct it to be paid by the husband in lieu of her dower and
distributive share in his estate: Id.
Such a provision in the decree being void, the wife's right of
power in her husband's estate, after his death, is unaffected by
it: Id.
The statute does not, in terms, authorize the court to make any
decree affecting the right of dower. The legislature contemplated
a reconciliation of the parties as probable, hence the provision it
authorizes to be made for the wife is a temporary one : Id.
ENTRY.

Writ of Disclaimer.-In a writ of entry, if the tenant disclaims a part or all of the land demanded, he is held thereby to
admit the demandant's titleto the land disclaimed, and is estopped.
afterward to deny it. But such admission and estoppeltis not
rendered final and absolutely conclusive until after judgment:
Wells v. Jackson Iron Co., 50 N. H.
Therefore in such case, if the tenant disclaims part of the land
demanded and pleads the general issue as to the residue, and the
plaintiff accepts the disclaimer, and joins the issue, the tenant
may, at any time before judgment, for cause shown, have leave
to amend his disclaimer so as to cover a greater or less amount
of land than that originally disclaimed: Id.
EVIDENCE.
Experts.-The rules prescribing the qualifications of experts
are established by law; but whether a witness offered as an expert
has the legal qualifications which entitle him to testify in that capacity, is a question of fact to be decided by the court, in the exercise of its discretion, at the trial of the cause; and the decision
of the presiding jhdge, in such a case, is not subject to exception
or revision: Dole v. Johnson, 50 N. H.
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A consideration of the essential qualifications which a person
should possess in order to be admitted to testify as an expert: 1d.
LIEN.

Laborer'sLienfor Work on Property.-By the principle of the
common law, a man who has the lawful possession of a thing and
has expended his money or labor upon it, at the request of the
owner, has a lien upon theproperty, and a right to retain possession
of it until his demand is satisfied: Jacobs v. Knapp, 50 N. H.
This lien is in the nature of a pledge by the owner of the property
to the party with whom he contracts forlabor to bebestowed upon
it; but it is a personal right and interest, which can only be created
by the owner or by his authority. A sub-contractor, or any servant
of the person entitled to the lien, acquires no.interest in the property
by reason of the qualified rights or interes t of his employer: Id.
Under § 14, Ch. 125, Gen. Stat., which provides that "any person who labors at cutting, hauling or drawing wood, bark, logs,
or lumber, shall have a lien thereon for his personal services
*
*
*
to continue sixty days after the services are performed, and may be secured by attachment," such lien is limited
to the party, alone, who contracts with the owner of the property
upon which the labor of the contractor and all his sub-contractors
or servants is expended: Id.
A statute providing for the enforcement of a laborer's lien by
an action against the person or property of a party between
whom and the plaintiff no privity of contract ever existed, is unconstitutional: Id.
PRAcTICE.

Trial--Directionas to Verdict--Questions for the Jur.-It
is not only the right but the duty of the court to direct the verdict which the jury shall give, when the evidence in the case is so
preponderating in favor of one of the parties -hatif a verdict should
be found one way, the court would set it aside as against thb evidence: Fishet. al v. Davis, 62 Barb.
The converse of the rule, to wit: that when the evidence is
not so preponderating in favor of one of the parties as that the
court would set aside a verdict found against the evidence, the
case must go to the jury, is equally well settled: Id.
Upon the question whether promissory notes, given by the
plaintiffs to the defendant, were given in payment of a debt, as
claimed by the defendant, or as a loan to him, as claimed by the
plaintiffs, the fact that the plaintiffs have made payments upon
such notes to the defendant as the owner and holder, upon demand of payment as a matter of right, is a circumstance of such
force and significance that the jury should be allowed to say what
weight it should have on the issue between the parties: Id.
And, in an action to recover back the amount advanced, as being a loan, there being strong evidence that the notes were delivered as part payment for property purchased by the plaintiffs
of the defendant, and not by way of loan, it is erroneous for the
judge to direct a verdict for the plaintiffs: Id.

